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ABSTRACT 
Voluntary conservation agreements are becoming increasingly important in implementing the Endangered 
Species Act on private land. We analyze when such agreements arise and what level of conservation they 
generate in the presence of uncertainty about future government regulation and conservation benefits. Our 
results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement depends on the availability of assurances regarding 
future regulation. In particular, an agreement may not be reached if there is a high degree of uncertainty 
regarding future conservation requirements. The level of conservation attainable from an agreement 
depends on the likelihood of regulation, the bargaining power of the parties, the irreversibility of 
development, and the availability of assurances. Under conditions likely to hold in practice, a higher 
conservation level may be achieved by offering assurances. However, this level of conservation will not 
be optimal, and may be lower than that attainable from regulation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The conservation of endangered species on private land has been a controversial subject for 
several years. The restrictions imposed on private activity by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) have 
raised vigorous opposition from property rights advocates. This has made these restrictions a politically 
sensitive subject, hindering enforcement of the ESA. On the other hand, protecting endangered species on 
private land may be instrumental in determining the overall success of recovery efforts under the ESA; 
more than half of the listed endangered species have at least 80% of their habitat on private land (FWS 
1997).  
It has been argued that the ESA has failed to attain its objective of protecting endangered species. 
A common argument is that it generates perverse incentives that might compel landowners to manage 
their land in a way that harms endangered species. This argument has been made by Polasky and 
Doremus (1998), Polasky (2001), and Innes (2000), and anecdotal evidence of such behavior abounds 
(see, e.g., Mann and Plummer 1995, Ruhl 1998, Bean 1998). Empirical evidence has been found in the 
case of the red-cockaded woodpecker (Michael and Lueck 2000).  
Another argument made against the ESA is that it attempts to deter harmful conduct by 
landowners, but does nothing to encourage desirable behavior. In numerous cases the absence of harmful 
behavior may not be enough to address serious threats to endangered species. Many require active 
management of their habitat. These kinds of activities entail costs that even well-meaning landowners 
might not be willing to undertake. Additionally, there are opportunity costs of forgone revenue from the 
most profitable use of the property. Thus, the ESA seems to grant inadequate protection to endangered 
species on private land. Hence, there has been a call for the use of incentives to complement the existing 
regulatory framework.  
At present the most widely used incentives programs are based on reforms to the ESA that 
provide landowners with assurances regarding future regulation. These reforms take the form of voluntary 
agreements, such as Habitat Conservation Plans (HCP) with a “no surprises” policy or Safe Harbor 
Agreements (SHAs) (Wilcove et al. 1996, Bean and Wilcove 1996, FWS 1999). A key characteristic of   3 
these programs is that the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and a landowner reach a voluntary agreement 
on a conservation program to be implemented by the landowner. In return, FWS guarantees to the 
landowner that he will not have to incur additional costs or be subject to further restrictions in the future.  
Given that voluntary incentives programs, in particular HCPs, have become the main vehicle for 
implementation of the ESA on private land (Defenders of Wildlife 1998, Thomas 2001), it is important to 
ask under what conditions a landowner and a regulator will agree on such a program, and what levels of 
conservation one might expect as an outcome. The use of incentives for conservation of endangered 
species has been examined by Smith and Shogren (2001,2002). Additionally, voluntary agreements have 
been analyzed in the context of pollution abatement (see, e.g. Arora and Cason 1995, Segerson and Miceli 
1998, Wu and Babcock 1999), but these studies do not account for two issues that are particularly 
relevant in the context of endangered species conservation. The first one is the uncertainty inherent in the 
management of ecosystems and endangered species, which stems from our incomplete understanding of 
the biological world (Noss et al. 1997, Harding et al. 2001). The second, and closely related one, is the 
potential irreversibility of habitat loss and extinction as a result of land use decisions made as part of a 
voluntary agreement
1.  
This paper builds on the framework provided by Segerson and Miceli (1998) to analyze the 
interaction between a regulator and a landowner. It expands on their study by incorporating uncertainty 
and irreversibility. The analysis shows that one of their main results, that a voluntary agreement is 
reached as long as there is a positive probability of regulation, does not hold under uncertainty. 
Specifically, we show that in the presence of uncertainty about future regulation and conservation 
benefits, the likelihood of an agreement depends on the availability of assurances regarding future 
regulation.  
Our model also reveals that, under what is arguably the most common scenario in practice, HCPs 
and other incentives programs that provide assurances to landowners may result in higher conservation 
                                                 
1 For general treatments of conservation under uncertainty and irreversibility see, for example, Arrow and Fisher 
(1974), Hanemann (1989), Usategui (1990), or Viscusi (1985, 1988).   
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levels than agreements that do not offer assurances. However, assurances-based agreements may yield 
inefficient levels of conservation, perhaps even lower than those attainable through regulation.     
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic setup of the 
model, section III analyzes the interaction of regulator and landowner when assurances are offered, while 
section IV does the same for the case of no assurances. Section V presents a numerical example, and 
section VI concludes. 
II. MODEL SETUP 
 
We analyze the interaction between a regulator and a landowner using a two-period model, in 
which the second period represents the entire future time horizon. Both the regulator and the landowner 
know the state of the world in period 1, &1, but do not know the state of the world in period 2, &2. This 
reflects the uncertainty inherent in managing endangered species. For instance, small populations may be 
severely affected by unpredictable changes in environmental factors such as weather or food supply, by 
natural catastrophes, or by stochastic demographic and genetic factors. Additionally, as new knowledge is 
gained about a species, further management needs may be identified, even if there are no significant 
changes in the species’ environment. Therefore, management decisions made with the information 
available in period 1 may not be efficient ex post.  
The sequence of events is as follows. In period 1 the regulator decides whether to offer a 
Voluntary Conservation Agreement (VCA) or not. A VCA specifies the conservation levels cv1 and cv2 for 
period 1 and 2, respectively. If the regulator decides to make the offer, the landowner must choose 
whether to accept it or not. If he accepts, then he agrees to conservation levels cv1 and cv2. If the regulator 
decides not to make the offer, or the landowner does not accept it, then the landowner is regulated with 
probability p, and remains regulated in period 2
2. If the landowner is not regulated he develops his entire 
property and no conservation takes place. 
                                                 
2 Regulation is probabilistic because the regulator may be unable or unwilling to enforce the law due to information 
requirements, high burden of proof, or political considerations (Polasky and Doremus 1998).    5 
Since the future state of the world is not known in period 1, it is possible that when new 
information becomes available the regulator will make further demands for conservation. A VCA also 
includes a provision that specifies whether such a “surprise” is allowed. We analyze how a “no surprises” 
provision would affect the likelihood that a VCA is reached, and the resulting levels of conservation in 
the two periods.   
Let Bt(F￿&t) be the benefits to society from conservation level c in period t, with corresponding 
state of the world &. The argument &t in the benefit function will be omitted to simplify notation, and it is 
assumed that Bt’(· )>0 and Bt”(· )< 0, where the derivatives are with respect to c.  
  The cost of conservation is given by the compliance cost to the landowner
3 (including opportunity 
costs), ai(c), i = v, m. Following Segerson and Miceli (1998) we assume that both total and marginal costs 
are lower under a VCA than under regulation
4, and that costs of conservation are linear (i.e. ai(c)=aic). 
The reasoning behind our assumption is similar to that of Segerson and Miceli. When a landowner agrees 
to a conservation plan voluntarily, he has more flexibility to decide how to implement it. For instance, he 
can choose which part of his property he prefers to set aside for conservation, or he can decide to 
purchase a different tract of land to implement the conservation plan. This cost advantage implies that av 
< am. The payoff to the regulator is given by net social benefits, which are NSBit(ci)= Bt(ci) - aici. Note 
that the assumption about costs implies that NSBvt(c) > NSBmt(c) for any c. The landowner incurs costs 
from conservation, but derives no benefits. All benefits and costs corresponding to period 2 are present 
values. 
  In the following sections we analyze the outcome of the interaction between the regulator and the 
landowner under two basic scenarios: when the regulator offers assurances to the landowner (no 
surprises), and when he does not (surprises). Additionally, for each scenario we examine how 
irreversibility affects the outcomes. Specifically, we define irreversibility by assuming that the 
                                                 
3 For the sake of simplicity, we have left out the transaction costs to the regulator and assumed that the compliance 
costs are the same in both periods. These assumptions do not affect our results. 
4 Voluntary Conservation Agreements are assumed to be more cost-effective than command and control regulation. 
However, this may not be true for other forms of market-based regulation, such as tradable development rights.     6 
conservation level in period 2 cannot exceed that from period 1: ci2 ￿ ci1. Intuitively, this implies that 
developed land cannot be converted back to wildlife habitat.  
III. NO SURPRISES 
A. NO IRREVERSIBILITY 
  In this section we assume that there is a “no surprises” clause in the agreement signed in period 1 
by the regulator and the landowner. This means that the regulator guarantees that no additional 
conservation will be required in period 2, regardless of the new information that becomes available in the 
second period.  
Given these assumptions, the landowner enters into a VCA if and only if 
avcv1 + avcv2 ￿S [amcm1
* + amEcm2
*]       (1) 
where cm1
*  and Ecm2
* are the levels of conservation under regulation, set to maximize the expected net 
social benefit in each period. This implies that (cm1
*, Ecm2
*) is the only credible threat the regulator can 
make, since he would have an incentive to deviate from any other conservation levels. The regulator 
enters into a VCA if and only if 
NSBv1(cv1) + E NSBv2(cv2) ￿S [NSBm1(cm1
*) + E NSBm2(Ecm2
*)]     (2) 
  Note that if we assume that there is no change in the state of the world, and therefore no 
uncertainty, and that ci1 = ci2 = ci, conditions (1) and (2) can be rewritten as 2avcv ￿ ￿SDmcm
* and  
2NSBv(cv) ￿ ￿S16%m(cm
*), respectively. These correspond to the case analyzed by Segerson and Miceli 
(1998). Thus, our model is a generalization of theirs, and this particular scenario is the one that 
corresponds most closely to their specification.  
  Condition (1) gives the set of all combinations of cv1 and cv2 that are acceptable to the landowner:  







*] A C }       ( 3 )  
where C  is the highest level of total conservation (for both periods) that the landowner will agree to. The 
set SL is illustrated in Figure 1a.    7 
  Similarly, using condition (2) and the definition of net social benefits, we can define the set of all 
combinations of conservation levels acceptable to the regulator: 
SR = {(cv1, cv2)|cv1 + cv2 ￿
v a
1
[B1(cv1) + EB2(cv2) – p(NSBm (cm1
*)+ENSBm(cm2
*))]}   (4) 
Note that for small enough conservation levels the left hand side of (4) is positive, but the right hand side 
is negative, since the expected net social benefits from regulation are strictly positive. Thus, the inequality 
does not hold, which implies that there is a set of minimum conservation levels acceptable to the 
regulator. This set defines the lower boundary of SR. 
Likewise, for large enough levels of conservation the left hand side of (4) will be larger than the 
right hand side, since B(•) is concave. This means that there is also a set of maximum total conservation 
levels acceptable to the regulator. This set defines the upper boundary of SR.  

















































− =    
Given dNSBv2(cv2)/dcv2 > 0 and dNSBv2(cv2
1)/dcv2
1 < 0 for the lower and upper boundaries, 
respectively, and the concavity of NSBv(•), we have d
2cv2/dcv1
2 > 0 for the lower boundary and 
d
2cv2/dcv1
2 < 0 for the upper boundary. The set SR is illustrated in Figure 1b. 
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       FIGURE 1 
Sets of acceptable conservation levels 
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A VCA is possible whenever there is an intersection between SL and SR. This may be the case, for 
instance, if cv1
Min or cv2
Min (or both) are smaller thanC , where cv1
Min, cv2
Min are defined by cv2(cv1
Min) = 0 
and cv2(0) = cv2
Min. This is shown in Figure 2 (henceforth, the upper boundary of SR is not drawn to avoid 
cluttering the graph). 
FIGURE 2 
VCA Equilibrium 
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Note that if p = 0, the regulator will agree to any positive level of conservation, but the landowner 
will not accept any level of conservation. Thus, p > 0 is a necessary condition for a VCA. As proved in 
the Appendix, cv1
Min ￿ C  and cv2
Min
 ￿ C  for any positive probability of regulation. Therefore, p > 0 is   9 
also a sufficient condition for a VCA. This establishes the following proposition (which is analogous to 
Proposition 1 in Segerson and Miceli 1998). 
PROPOSITION 1. If assurances are offered as part of a VCA and the actions taken in period 1 are 
reversible, a VCA will be the equilibrium outcome of the interaction between landowner and regulator for 
any p > 0. 
The proof of Proposition 1, as well as all subsequent propositions, can be found in the Appendix. 
  As in Segerson and Miceli (1998), the result in Proposition 1 can be explained by the cost 
advantage offered by VCAs, which makes it in the best interest of both parties to enter into such an 
agreement. As section IV will show, however, the existence of assurances plays a key role in generating 
the result. 
Equilibrium Outcomes  
  Up to now, we have shown that a VCA is possible for any p > 0, and any (cv1, cv2) combination in 
{SL @ 6R} could be an equilibrium outcome. In this section, we turn our attention to the actual level of 
conservation resulting from a VCA. To establish a basis for comparison, let us define the first-best 
conservation levels.  To obtain the first-best outcome, the regulator would maximize net social benefits in 
period 1, then observe the state of the world in period 2 and maximize the net social benefits in that 
period. Let cv1
F and cv2
F be the first-best conservation levels in period 1 and 2, respectively. To illustrate, 
suppose that the benefit function is given by Bt(cit￿&t) = A(cit￿&t) – (cit￿&t)
2/2 , where &t > 0, i = v, m, t 
= 1, 2. Then the regulator chooses cvt to maximize NSBvt(cvt￿&t)=A(cvt￿&t) - (cvt￿&t)
2/2  – avcvt in period t 
= 1, 2. The resulting first-best conservation levels are cv1
F = A – &1 – av and cv2
F = A – &2 – av. Under this 
scenario, the regulator can choose the period 2 conservation level after &2 is observed. 
This first-best outcome may not be reached in a no-surprises VCA, since cv2 must be determined 
in the first period, when &2 is unknown. That is, a no-surprises VCA can at most achieve a second-best 
outcome by choosing cv1 and cv2 in period 1 to maximize the expected net social benefits over the two 
periods: 
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NSBv1(cv1￿&1)+E NSBv2(cv2￿&2) = A(cv1￿&1) – (cv1￿&1)
2/2  – avcv1  +  
      A(cv2￿(&2) – (cv1￿(&2)
2/2  – avcv2    (5) 
The resulting second-best conservation levels are  
cv1
* = A – &1 – av and cv2
* = A –(&2 – av     ( 6 )  
where (&2 > 0. Note that cv1
F = cv1
*, since the state of the world in period 1 is known.  
  The actual level of conservation resulting from a VCA could be any combination in {SL @ 6R}, 
depending on the degree of bargaining power of the regulator and the landowner
5. In what follows, we 
consider two extreme cases. 
(a) Type I Equilibrium. Suppose first that the regulator has all of the bargaining power, in the sense that 
he can choose the conservation levels that maximize the expected net social benefits from conservation, 
subject to a participation constraint for the landowner: 
  M a x   NSBv1(cv1￿&1) + E NSBv2(cv2￿&2) 
           cv1, cv2 
            ( 7 )  
    subject to   cv1 + cv2 ￿ C    
Solving this problem yields the following results, which are proved in the Appendix. 
PROPOSITION 2: (i) Under a VCA with a no-surprises clause, the first-best conservation level will 
generally not be achieved if future conservation benefits are uncertain. (ii) When the regulator has the 
bargaining power, the second-best conservation level will be achievable only if p(am/av) > 1. If p(am/av) < 
1, the total level of conservation under a voluntary agreement will be lower than that attainable under 
regulation. 
Proposition 2 suggests that the second-best outcome is possible only if the background threat of 
regulation is highly credible and the cost advantage of voluntary programs is large. Otherwise, the 
conservation level under a VCA is lower than that achievable under regulation.  
                                                 
5 “Bargaining power” in this context is defined as the ability to make a take-it-or leave-it offer. That is, the party that 
has the bargaining power can be thought of as moving first and offering a conservation level to the other party.   11 
(b) Type II Equilibrium.  Suppose now that the landowner has all of the bargaining power, in the sense 
that he chooses the conservation levels that minimize his expected costs, subject to a participation 
constraint for the regulator: 
  M i n   avcv1 + avcv2 
            cv1, cv2           ( 8 )  
 
            subject to       (cv1, cv2) ∈  SR 
 
Clearly, the landowner will choose conservation levels on the lower boundary of SR
6. This implies that the 
resulting total conservation level cannot be higher than the total conservation level achieved when the 
regulator has the bargaining power. Additionally, the total conservation level is smaller than the expected 
total conservation level under regulation if the background threat of regulation is highly credible and the 
cost advantage of voluntary agreements is large. Specifically, we obtain the following results (see the 
appendix for a proof). 
PROPOSITION 3: If the landowner has the bargaining power, the total two-period conservation level 
achieved under a VCA will be no larger than that attained when the regulator has the bargaining power. 
Furthermore, if p(am/av) < 1, the total conservation level under a VCA will be lower than that attainable 
under regulation.  
The results in Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that the parties’ bargaining power can have a 
significant effect on the outcome of a voluntary conservation agreement. Most agreements of this type are 
initiated by landowners (Defenders of Wildlife 1998), i.e. they have the bargaining power. Furthermore, 
enforcing the ESA may be quite difficult in practice due to information requirements, high burden of 
proof, and possibly political considerations (Polasky and Doremus 1998). This amounts to saying that p 
has traditionally been relatively low. Thus, even in cases when the regulator has the bargaining power, the 
outcome may be lower than the second-best. This implies that the conservation levels achieved by VCAs 
are likely to be inadequate, often below what would be achieved under regulation. 
 
                                                 
6 Specifically, the landowner will choose the point on the lower boundary of SR that is tangent to an isocost line.    12 
B. IRREVERSIBILITY 
  We now assume that the conservation level in period 2 can be no larger than that in period 1. This 
would be the case if, for example, the landowner is allowed to develop part of his forest in period 1 (e.g. 
build a house) as part of the VCA.  
  The set of acceptable conservation levels for the landowner and the regulator under irreversibility 
are given by 
SL
I = {(cv1, cv2)| cv1 + cv2 ￿ C , cv2 ￿ Fv1}        ( 9 )  
SR





*))],cv2 ￿F v1}     (10) 
Note that SL
I ⊂  SL and SR
I⊂ SR. This has the effect of decreasing the number of combinations of cv1 and 
cv2 acceptable to the landowner and the regulator. The sets SL
I and SR
I are depicted in Figures 3a and 3b, 
respectively. 
FIGURE 3 
    Set of acceptable conservation levels under irreversibility 
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  As in the preceding section, a VCA will be the equilibrium outcome of the interaction between 
the landowner and the regulator for any positive probability of regulation, since cv1
Min ￿ C  implies that SL
I 
@ 6R
I ￿ Ø (this follows from the proof of Proposition 1). Thus, irreversibility does not affect the result that 
a VCA is reachable for any p > 0. However, it may affect the resulting equilibrium conservation levels. 
Specifically, the fact that {SL
I @ 6R
I} ⊂  {SL
 @ 6R} implies that some conservation levels attainable under   13 
our original assumption are no longer feasible under irreversibility. In particular, the second-best 
conservation levels (cv1
*, cv2
*) may no longer be attainable, even if they are acceptable to the landowner. 
  To illustrate this point, consider the example used in the preceding section. In a Type I 
equilibrium the regulator would choose conservation levels for both periods to solve 
Max   A(cv1￿&1) – (cv1￿&1)
2/2  – avcv1  + A(cv2￿(&2) – (cv2￿(&2)
2/2  – avcv2 
cv1,cv2 
 
subject to  cv1 + cv2 ￿ C ; cv2 ￿F v1         ( 1 1 )  
  
  Suppose that the participation constraint is not binding, but that the irreversibility constraint is. 
Then the regulator would choose cv1
*I = cv2
*I = A – (&1 ￿( &2)/2  – av (i.e. point c
*I in Figure 4), which 
differ from cv1
* and cv2
*, the second-best conservation levels (i.e. point c
* in Figure 4).  
 
FIGURE 4 
   VCA  Equilibrium  Under  Irreversibility 
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  If the participation constraint is binding as well, the regulator will choose conservation levels 
C /2 in both periods. Finally, in a Type II equilibrium the landowner minimizes avcv1 + avcv2 subject to 
(cv1, cv2) ∈  SR




In sum, by limiting the set of feasible outcomes, irreversibility further curtails the regulator’s 
ability to obtain desirable conservation results under a VCA. There are many examples where 
irreversibility plays an important role. For instance, a number of HCPs in the southeastern United States   14 
are limited to translocating red-cockaded woodpeckers from private to federal forests, in order to harvest 
the former. However, critics of these plans contend that male woodpeckers do not adapt easily to their 
new surroundings, and often attempt to return to their original home (Kaiser, 1997). Of course, once their 
original habitat has been harvested, there is little else that can be done to correct the problem. This 
provides an argument for the regulator to exercise caution regarding the conditions he agrees to under a 
VCA.  
IV. SURPRISES 
In this section we consider a setting in which “surprises” are possible, in the sense that in period 2 
the regulator may impose conservation requirements on the landowner which go beyond those agreed to 
in period 1. To illustrate the difference between the surprises and no-surprises scenarios, consider the case 
of one of the safe-harbor programs for red-cockaded woodpeckers in North Carolina (Defenders of 
Wildlife 1998). Under this program, participating landowners agreed to perform voluntary habitat 
management for woodpeckers that already occupied their property and to enhance habitat in other parts of 
the land not inhabited by the birds. Under a surprises scenario, further land-use restrictions would be 
imposed if additional woodpeckers occupied the newly enhanced habitat. However, given the assurances 
provided by the agreement under the no-surprises policy, any additional woodpecker settlements on the 
property will not trigger further restrictions.  
A. NO IRREVERSIBILITY 
  In this section, we assume that the regulator and landowner agree on conservation levels cv1 and 
cv2 in period 1, but the regulator does not offer any assurances regarding additional conservation in period 
2. Specifically, with probability q, 0 < q ￿ ￿￿ WKH UHJXODWRU ZLOO VXUSULVH WKH ODQGRZQHU E\ UHTXLULQJ
additional conservation cs in period 2
7, where ENSBv2(cv2
 + cs) > E NSBv2(cv2). The amount of additional 
conservation required depends on &2, the state of the world in period 2, which makes cs a stochastic 
                                                 
7 We assume that the probability q is exogenous. It may be interpreted as the likelihood that &2 reaches some 
threshold that triggers additional conservation, or it may characterize the regulator’s a priori unknown willingness 
or ability to require more conservation.    15 
variable
8. For simplicity, we assume that it is normally distributed: cs ~ N(cs
E￿1
2), which implies that (cs – 
cs
E)￿1 a1 (0,1). Thus,  
q = Pr[cs > 0] = Pr[(cs – cs
E)￿1 ! -cs
E￿1] = 1 – Pr[(cs – cs
E)￿1 ￿ -cs
E￿1] = 1 - -￿￿￿￿  
ZKHUH ￿ A - cs
E￿1
2 and -(•) is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution. The 
truncated mean of cs is given by (Greene 2000) 
  E(cs|cs > 0) = cs
E + 
q
) (γ σ φ
        ( 1 2 )  
where φ (•) is the probability density function for the standard normal distribution.  
Under these conditions, the landowner will enter into a VCA if and only if 
  avcv1 + avcv2 + qavcs
E ￿ 1φ ￿￿￿ ￿ pam (cm1
* + Ecm2
*)    
Thus, the acceptance set for the landowner is  
SL’ = {(cv1,cv2)|cv1 + cv2 ￿ C  – qcs
E - 1φ ￿￿￿ =C -qE(cs|cs > 0)A ' C }    (13)   
where  ' C  gives the maximum level of conservation acceptable to the landowner when no assurances are 
offered. Note that  ' C <C , and that the difference is affected by the amount of the expected surprise and 
by the degree of uncertainty, as measured by the standard deviation 1. This implies that SL’⊂ SL. That is, 
the possibility of a surprise in period 2 reduces the likelihood that the landowner will be willing to enter 
into a VCA. The reason is clear: a possible surprise means potentially larger costs for the landowner, so 
he has less to gain from entering into an agreement.  
  The regulator will enter into a VCA if and only if 
NSBv1(cv1)+qENSBv2(cv2+ cs
E ￿ 1φ ￿￿￿/q) + (1-q)ENSBv2(cv2) ￿S [NSBm1(cm1
*)+E NSBm2(cm2
*)] 
Thus, the acceptance set for the regulator is 
                                                 
8 In order to focus on the effect of surprises on first period decisions, we assume that the landowner will comply 
with the regulator’s demand for more conservation in period 2. The underlying supposition is that, should the 
landowner refuse to comply, he will be regulated with probability one in the second period, and that the resulting 
costs (possibly including fines) would be high enough to deter him from not complying. This can be justified by 
noting that, by participating in period 1, the landowner reveals private information about his land to the regulator, 
thereby assuring that he will be regulated in period 2 if he does not comply.    16 
SR
’={(cv1,cv2)|cv1 +cv2 ￿ C +
v a
1







E ￿ 1φ ￿￿￿/q)-E B2(cv2) - av(cs
E ￿ 1φ ￿￿￿/q)]} (14)   
Note that the last term in brackets on the right-hand side of (14) is E NSBv2(cv2
 + Ecs) –  
E NSBv2(cv2)> 0. This implies that the regulator is more likely to enter into a VCA than under the no-
surprises scenario. The reason is that, by not offering assurances, the regulator retains the flexibility to use 
the information that becomes available in the second period and thereby increase net social benefits. 
Figure 5 shows the changes in the sets of acceptable conservation levels when going from a no-surprises 
to a surprises scenario.          
   FIGURE 5 
      Changes in sets of acceptable conservation levels 
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  Since the landowner is less willing to enter into a VCA when surprises are possible, and the 
regulator is more willing to enter, the net effect of surprises on the likelihood of reaching a VCA is 
ambiguous. However, a potential surprise raises the possibility that no VCA will be reached. That is, 
proposition 1 does not hold when assurances are not offered. Specifically, if the expected surprise and the 
degree of uncertainty are large enough, the landowner’s set of acceptable conservation levels can shrink 
more than the regulator’s set expands, so that there is no intersection between these sets. This possibility   17 
is shown in Figure 6, where the dashed lines represent the no-surprises scenario and the solid lines 
represent the surprises scenario. 
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  No VCA will be reached in the surprises scenario if cv2’(cv1)
  > ' C  - cv1 for any cv1 ∈ [0, ' C ]. This 
may be the case if the expected additional conservation and the degree of uncertainty are large. 
Specifically, for the quadratic benefit function we can show that cv2’(cv1)
























  ∀ cv1 ∈ [0, ' C ]       (15) 
where D and E are functions of the parameters (see the Appendix). In Section V, we give an example of 
parameter values for which this condition holds. This result is summarized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4:  If no assurances are offered, the regulator and the landowner will not reach a VCA if 
cv2’(cv1)
 >  ' C  - cv1  for any cv1∈ [0, ' C ]. This may be the case if the expected surprise and the degree of 
uncertainty are large.   
Proposition 4 shows that when surprises are possible the regulator and the landowner may not be 
able to reach an agreement, whereas they will always do so in a no-surprises scenario. These results 
suggest that offering assurances to landowners may increase the likelihood that they will enter into a 
VCA, particularly in cases where there is significant uncertainty about future conservation needs.     18 
The actual experience with HCPs seems to confirm this intuition. Although HCPs were 
incorporated into the ESA in 1982, less than 50 plans had been requested and approved before the “no 
surprises” policy was announced in 1994. In 1995 this number shot up to close to 130 plans (Kaiser 
1997). As of February of 2001, 341 HCPs covering 30 million acres had been approved (FWS 2001). 
Equilibrium Outcomes 
As in the no-surprises scenario, we consider two types of equilibrium, based on which party has 
the bargaining power.  
Type I Equilibrium 
In a Type I equilibrium the regulator has the bargaining power. If additional conservation is 
required in the second period, he will set cs so that cv2 + cs = cv2
F. Therefore, in period 1 he chooses 
conservation levels cv1
 and cv2 to maximize 
NSBv1(cv1) + q ENSBv2(Ecv2
F) + (1-q) ENSBv2(cv2) 
subject to  c v1 +q Ecv2
F+(1-q)cv2  ￿ C         (16) 
where Ecv2
F is the expected value of cv2
F in period 1. In this case, we can prove the following results.  
PROPOSITION 5: (i) If the regulator has the bargaining power in a VCA that does not offer assurances, 
the first-best outcome is achievable if p(am/av) > 1. Under these conditions, a surprises VCA will generate 
at least as much conservation as a no-surprises VCA. (ii) If p(am/av) ￿ 1, the first-best outcome is 
generally not achieved. Furthermore, the resulting conservation level may be lower than in a no-
surprises VCA, and lower than that attainable under regulation.  
  The proof of proposition 5 is given in the appendix. The results in proposition 5 suggest that a 
surprises VCA will be preferred to a no-surprises VCA as long as the threat of regulation and the cost 
advantage of voluntary agreements are high enough. However, if the threat of regulation and the cost 
advantage are not high enough, a no-surprises VCA may result in a higher level of conservation. 
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Type II Equilibrium 
In a Type II equilibrium the landowner has the bargaining power. In period 1 he chooses 
conservation levels cv1 and cv2 to minimize  
avcv1 +q av(Ecv2
F)+(1-q)avcv2 
subject to     (cv1, cv2) ∈  SR’         ( 1 7 )  
In this case, we can prove the following results (see the proof in the appendix).  
PROPOSITION 6: (i) If the landowner has the bargaining power in a VCA that does not offer 
assurances, the first-best outcome will generally not be reached. (ii) If no additional conservation takes 
place in the second period, the total conservation level may be lower than when the regulator has the 
bargaining power. Furthermore, if p(am/av) ￿ ￿￿ WKH WRWDO FRQVHUYDWLRQ LV ORZHU WKDQ LQ D QR -surprises 
VCA and lower than that attainable under regulation.  
  The results presented in Propositions 4, 5, and 6 suggest that landowners who face uncertain and 
potentially significant costs from additional conservation requirements may not be willing to commit to 
high conservation levels, and may even be unwilling to participate in an agreement at all. This highlights 
the role that assurances can play as an incentive for landowners to participate in conservation programs. 
On the other hand, offering assurances limits the regulator’s ability to incorporate new information into 
his management choices and may thereby preclude him from achieving desirable outcomes.  
  This tradeoff motivates a comparison of the conservation outcomes under the surprises and no-
surprises scenarios. A key distinction is that, if the regulator has the bargaining power, a VCA that allows 
for surprises can achieve the first-best total conservation level, whereas a no-surprises agreement may not. 
A more interesting comparison is with the case where no additional conservation takes place (i.e. cs = 0), 
because the outcome depends only on choices made in the first period, as in a no-surprises VCA. 
  When regulation is likely and the regulator has the bargaining power, a VCA that allows for 
surprises will bring about at least as much conservation as a no-surprises VCA. However, if these 
conditions do not hold, a no-surprises VCA may well yield a higher conservation level. There are two 
main effects behind these results. A large and highly uncertain surprise decreases the conservation levels   20 
that the landowner is willing to accept. On the other hand, it makes the regulator more willing to accept 
low conservation levels. As a result, if no additional conservation takes place the resulting conservation 
level will be low.  
   The most common scenario in practice is likely to be characterized by a low probability of 
regulation and the landowner possessing bargaining power. Hence, these results suggest that the FWS’s 
current approach of offering no-surprises agreements to landowners may be somewhat justified. However, 
the resulting conservation levels, as argued, are likely to be inefficient. 
B. IRREVERSIBILITY 
  If we relax the assumption that the actions from period 1 are reversible, the acceptance sets for 
the landowner and the regulator are the same as in conditions (13) and (14), with the addition of the 
constraint cv2 + cs ￿ Fv1. The analysis for this case is analogous to the corresponding case in the no-
surprises scenario, so we do not repeat it. The results are equivalent as well: although a VCA may be 
reachable under irreversibility, the equilibrium outcomes may be different than under reversibility. In 
particular, the first-best outcome can be achieved only if cv2
F ￿ cv1
F. 
The Case for a Combination of Incentives 
  Let us focus on what is probably the most common outcome from a VCA. Suppose that the 
landowner has the bargaining power, that the probability of regulation is low, and that a no-surprises 
VCA has been reached. Recall that, in such a situation, the resulting total level of conservation would be 
lower than the first best and possibly lower than that attainable under regulation as well. A relevant policy 
question, then, is how to increase the conservation level offered by the landowner. As we will show, 
offering a side payment to the landowner for entering into a VCA can increase the conservation level he 
offers. 
  The landowner chooses to offer (cv1
L, cv2
L) to enter into a VCA by minimizing his costs subject to 
a participation constraint for the regulator (see (8)).  Suppose that the regulator offers to the landowner a 
side payment of S(cv1,cv2) for conservation levels cv1 and cv2 in the two periods. Then the landowner solves 
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Max -avcv1 - avcv2 +S(cv1,cv2)          
          cv1, cv2 
 
subject to             (cv1, cv2) ∈  SR           ( 1 8 )  
         
  It is easy to see that the landowner will offer a conservation level higher than the minimum 
whenever the side payment is higher than the expected cost difference, i.e. S(cv1,cv2) > av[(cv1+cv2) – 
(cv1
L+cv2
L)]. Furthermore, if the side payment is set equal to the expected net social benefits from 
conservation, i.e. S(cv1,cv2) = B1(cv1) +E B2(cv2), then (18) has the same objective as the regulator’s 
expected benefit maximization problem (7). Thus the landowner will offer cv
*, which is the same 
conservation level the regulator would offer.  
This result suggests that the conservation outcomes from VCAs can be improved by offering 
financial incentives to landowners in addition to assurances. These could take the form of cost-sharing 
payments for the management activities necessary to generate cv, or “rent” payments that compensate for 
income lost because of carrying out those activities.   
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
  In this section, we present a numerical example to illustrate the main points made in this paper. 
We assume that the benefit function is quadratic: Bt(cit)=A(cit￿&t) – (cit￿&t)
2/2, where A, &t > 0.  
a. No Surprises 
  We begin with the case where the VCA offers assurances. The parameters values are: A = 1800, 
&1 = 8, (&2= 7, am = 1.1, av = 0.6. Table I shows the conservation outcomes for various levels of p and 
different allocations of bargaining power (BP=R for regulator, L for landowner).   22 
TABLE I 
No-Surprises Conservation Outcomes 
 
Scenario   C         (cv1
*,cv2
*)       (cv1
R,cv2
R)     (cv1
RI,cv2
RI)      (cm1
*,Ecm2




1a: p=0.8, BP=R      5255    (1791,1792)
+      -------           -------           (1791,1792)        ------- 
 
2a: p=0.4, BP=R      2627    (1791,1792)   (1313,1314)
+    -------          (1791,1792)         ------- 
 
3a: Irreversibility     5255    (1791,1792)     -------         (1791,1791)
+   (1791,1792)         ------- 
      p=0.8, BP=R 
 
4a: p=0.8, BP=L      5255        -------          --------          -------            (1791,1792)     (986,987)
+ 
The final outcome in each scenario is indicated by the 
+ sign.  
  Scenarios 1a and 2a illustrate the effect of lowering the probability of regulation. The second best 
outcome, (cv1
*,cv2
*), is lower than the maximum acceptable to the landowner: cv1
*+ cv2
* =  3583 < C = 
5255. Thus the outcome in Scenario 1a is (cv1
*,cv2
*). In Scenario 2a, the probability of regulation is lower, 
and hence so is C . The second best outcome (cv1
*,cv2
*) is now higher than C , so it is not acceptable to 
the landowner. Thus, the outcome is (cv1
R,cv2
R), where  cv1
R + cv2
R = 2627, which is lower than that 
attainable under regulation. 
  Scenario 3a illustrates the effect of irreversibility. Since cv2
* > cv1
*, this outcome is not feasible 
under irreversibility. Hence, the regulator chooses (cv1
RI,cv2
RI) = (1791,1791), which is lower than the level 
of conservation attained when there is no irreversibility. 
  Finally, Scenario 4a shows the outcome when the landowner has the bargaining power. He 
chooses conservation levels (cv1
L,cv2
L). Note that the total conservation level is lower than that obtained 
when the regulator has the bargaining power. It is also lower than that attainable under regulation. This 
can be seen in Figure 7, which shows the outcomes for different levels of p when the regulator has the 
bargaining power (cv1
R+cv2
R), the landowner has the bargaining power (cv1
L+cv2
L), and under regulation 
(cm1
*+Ecm2
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FIGURE 7 














  Next, we illustrate the case of a VCA that does not offer assurances. We start by illustrating the 
possibility that no VCA will be reached if the expected additional conservation and the degree of 
uncertainty are high enough. We set p = 0.37, &1 = 5, (&2 = 4, am = 1.1, av = 1.09, A = 72, q = 0.5. When 
cs
E = 35 and 1 = 70, a VCA is reached (see Fig. 8a). However, when cs
E = 38.5 and 1 = 75.5, no VCA is 

























E = 35, 1  =  70      (b) No VCA: cs
E = 38.5, 1 = 75.5   24 
Finally, we assume that a VCA is reached and compare the outcomes with those of a no-surprises 
VCA. The parameter values are the same as those used to generate Table I, and we set q = 0.8. Table II 
shows the conservation outcomes for various levels of p and different allocations of bargaining power. To 
make the comparison interesting we assume that no additional conservation takes place in period 2 (i.e. cs 
= 0), except in Scenario 1b. 
TABLE II 
Surprises Conservation Outcomes 
 
Scenario         C -qEcv2
F      (cv1
F,cv2
F)      (cv1
R’,cv2
R’)       (cm1
*,Ecm2




1b: p=0.8, BP=R, cs>0      4179        (1791,1792)
+       -------           (1791,1792)             ------- 
 
2b: p= 0.4, BP=R, cs= 0    1193        (1791,1792)      (994,995)
+      (1791,1792)             ------- 
 
3b: p=0.8, BP=L, cs= 0     4179        (1791,1792)      -------           (1791,1792)          (751,752)
+ 
The outcome in each scenario is indicated by the 
+ sign. 
  Scenario 1b illustrates a case in which the first-best outcome is achieved. Because cv1
F+(1-q)cv2
F= 
2149 < C -qEcv2
F = 4179, this outcome is acceptable to the landowner. In Scenario 2b, the probability of 
regulation is lower. The first-best outcome is no longer achievable, and the regulator chooses (cv1
R’,cv2
R’). 
Note that the total conservation outcome is lower than that attainable under regulation. It is also lower 
than that achieved with a no-surprises VCA (Scenario 2a in Table I). Finally, in Scenario 3b the 
landowner has the bargaining power. Compare this case with Scenario 4a in Table I. The probability of 
regulation is the same, but the outcome chosen by the regulator yields a lower total conservation in 
Scenario 3b, where additional conservation in period 2 is expected. It is evident from comparing the 
outcomes in Table I and Table II that offering assurances to landowners can increase the conservation 
level obtained from a VCA, particularly when the likelihood of regulation is low and the landowners has 
the bargaining power.  This simple numerical example illustrates that all the scenarios discussed in the 
theoretical model are possible. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper analyzed the conditions that lead to VCA, and the resulting conservation levels. The 
analysis showed that whether a VCA is reached depends on whether assurances are offered as part of the 
agreement or not. In particular, offering assurances may increase the likelihood that a VCA will be 
reached. Specifically, the landowner and the regulator may not reach a VCA when there is a large degree 
of uncertainty regarding future conservation requirements. In addition, VCAs that do not offer assurances 
may result in lower levels of conservation than VCAs that do. Finally, the conservation level resulting 
from a VCA may also be lower under irreversibility than when management actions taken under the VCA 
are reversible.  
  Our analysis also showed that the conservation level generated by a VCA depends on which party 
has the bargaining power, as well as on the irreversibility of actions taken in the first period. Specifically, 
the conservation level will be lower when the landowner has the bargaining power. Furthermore, we 
argued that in practice the conservation levels generated by a VCA are likely to be inadequate because the 
landowner has an informational advantage, and because the threat of regulation is low. Under these 
circumstances, combining assurances with financial incentives might increase the level of conservation 
achieved by a VCA.   
  Although our analysis has focused on the specific issue of endangered species, the framework 
presented here should apply to other contexts in which uncertainty and irreversibility are relevant and 
assurances-based incentives are used to complement command-and-control regulation. For instance, 
industries negotiating plans for management of imperiled aquatic ecosystems have sought assurances 
against enforcement of the Clean Water Act, the Federal Power Act, and several other federal and state 
environmental laws. Similarly, the electric utility industry has lobbied Congress to include no-surprises 
clauses in relicensing agreements for hydroelectric facilities, so that the terms of the license could not be 
revised due to environmental reasons (Kostyack 1998). 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We need to show that cv1
Min ￿ C and cv2
Min ￿ C  for all p > 0. We prove that this holds for cv1
Min; 
the argument for cv2
Min
 is the same. The acceptance set for the regulator can be written as 
SR = {(cv1,cv2)| cv1 + cv2 ￿ C + (1/av)[B1(cv1) + EB2(cv2) – p(B1(cm1
*) + EB2(cm2
*))]}  (A1) 
If no conservation takes place in period 2, (A1) becomes 
SR = {(cv1,0)| cv1 ￿ C + (1/av)[B1(cv1) – p(B1(cm1
*) + EB2(cm2
*))]}  (A2) 
For small enough values of cv1, (A2) does not hold. To see this, note that for small cv1 the left 
hand side of (A2) will be positive, whereas the right hand side will be negative, since p(B1(cm1
*) + 
EB2(cm2
*)) > 0. cv1
Min is defined as the minimum conservation level for which (A2) holds with equality: 
  cv1






*))]    (A3) 
This implies that for any conservation level smaller than cv1
Min, the left hand side of (A3) is positive, 
whereas the right hand side is negative. That is, there exists an arbitrarily small 0 ! 0 such that cv1
Min – 0 > 
0 and C +(1/av) [B1(cv1
Min- 0) – p(B1(cm1
*)+ E B2(cm2
*))] < 0.       
Since C = p(am/av)(cm1
*+Ecm2
*) > 0 and av > 0, this implies B1(cv1
Min- 0) – p(B1(cm1
*)+ E B2(cm2
*)) < 0. 




*)) ￿ ￿￿ )LQDOO\￿ IURP ￿$￿￿￿ WKLV PHDQV WKDW cv1
Min ￿ C . 
Proof of Proposition 2 
First, note that the first-best outcome will only be achieved if (&2 = &2, which will generally not 
be the case. Consider next the case where the participation constraint for the landowner is not binding, 
and hence the regulator offers the second-best conservation levels (cv1
*, cv2
*). This means that cvi
* = arg 
max NSBvi > cmi









*), implies that p(am/av) > 1.    27 
If the participation constraint is binding, the conservation level is cv1
R+cv2
R = C = 
p(am/av)(cm1
*+Ecm2





Proof of Proposition 3 
The conservation levels chosen by the landowner are  
(cv1
L, cv2
L) = arg min {av(cv1 + cv2)|(cv1, cv2) ∈ SR} ,         ( A 4 )  
and the corresponding total conservation level is cv1
L + cv2





* ￿ C , or cv1
R + cv2













*), which contradicts 
(A4). The same argument holds for cv1
R + cv2










To see that the conservation level chosen by the landowner is smaller than cm1
*+ Ecm2
* if p(am/av) 
< 1, note that the lower boundary of SR, (cv1, cv2
0(cv1)), is defined by  
cv1 + cv2 = p (am/av)(cm1
*+Ecm2
*) + 1/av [B1(cv1)+EB2(cv2)-p(B1(cm1
*)+EB2(Ecm2
*))]  (A5) 
Following the same logic as in the proof of proposition 1, there exist arbitrarily small 01 > 0 and 02 
> 0 such that  (cv1 - 01) + (cv2 – 02) > 0 and B1(cv1 - 01)+EB2(cv2 – 02) – p(B1(cm1
*)+EB2(Ecm2
*)) < 0. Given 
that 01 and 02 are arbitrarily small, the continuity of the benefit function implies that B1(cv1)+EB2(cv2) - 
p(B1(cm1
*)+EB2(Ecm2
*)) ￿ 0. Therefore, cv1 + cv2 < cm1
*+Ecm2
* for p(am/av) < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
It is easy to see that if cv2’(cv1) >  ' C  - cv1 for any cv1 ∈ [0, ' C ], then {SR’ @ 6L’} = Ø, so no VCA 
is reached. To see that this may be the case if the expected surprise and the degree of uncertainty are 
large, let condition (14) hold with equality, and write cv2’(cv1) as 
cv2’(cv1) = C - cv1 + (1/av)[B1(cv1) + EB2(cv2’(cv1)) – p(B1(cm1
*) + EB2(cm2
*))] + 
         (q/av)[EB2(cv2’(cv1) + cs
E + 1φ (￿)/q) – EB2(cv2’(cv1)) – av(cs
E + 1φ (￿)/q)]} (A6) 
Note that  ' C  = C - q(cs
E + 1φ (￿)/q) and rearrange (A6) to obtain   28 
cv2’(cv1) – ( ' C - cv1) = (1/av)[B1(cv1) + EB2(cv2’(cv1)) – p(B1(cm1
*) + EB2(cm2
*))] + 
             (q/av)[EB2(cv2’(cv1) + cs
E + 1φ (￿)/q) – EB2(cv2’(cv1))]    (A7) 
 The second expression on the right side of (A7) is always positive, since B(•) is increasing. If the 
first term on the right side of (A7) is positive as well, then cv2’(cv1) > ( ' C - cv1). If the first term is 
negative, then cv2’(cv1) > ( ' C - cv1) will hold if the second term on the right of (A7) is large enough, i.e. if  
cs
E + 1φ (￿)/q is large enough. To show that this is possible, it suffices to present an example. With the 
quadratic functional form, the boundary of SR’ is given by  
cv2’(cv1) = A – av – (&2 – q(cS
E + (1φ (￿)/q)) – {[A – av - (&2 - q(cS
E + (1φ (￿)/q))]
2 - (&2
2 + 2[A - q(cS
E + 
(1φ (￿)/q))](&2 + 2q(A – av)(cS
E + (1φ (￿)/q)) – q(cS
E + (1φ (￿)/q))





1/2       ( A 8 )   
Using (A8) and  ' C  = C - q(cs
E + 1φ (￿)/q), and defining 
 D  A p(am/av)[2(A – am) - &1 - (&2] - &1 - (&2   and 
E A ￿￿A – av - (&2) p(am/av)[2(A – am) - &1 - (&2] – [p(am/av)(2(A – am) - &1 - (&2)]
2 +          
2A(&1 ￿( &2) – (&1
2￿(&2
2) – 2p[(A – am)
2 + am(&1 ￿( &2)] 
it is straightforward to show that cv2(cv1) - ( ' C - cv1)> 0 if and only if cS
E + (1φ (￿)/q) > [(2(Dcv1 – 
cv1
2)+E)/q(1-q)]
1/2, which gives condition (15). 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Consider first the case where the participation constraint for the landowner is not binding. This 
means that cvi
* = arg max NSBvi > cmi












F. Together with the participation 
constraint, this implies that p(am/av) > 1.  The regulator will choose cv1
F in the first period. If cs > 0, the 
total conservation level is cv1
F + cv2





* (see (6)), which is the second-best. This is the best outcome that can be achieved with a 
no-surprises VCA.   29 
Now consider the case where the constraint is binding. Since ￿C /￿￿p am/av) = cm1
* + Ecm2
* > 0, 
this is the case for p(am/av) ￿ 1. The regulator chooses conservation levels (cv1
R’,cv2
R’) such that cv1
R’ + (1-
q)cv2
R’ = C - qEcv2
F. If cs > 0, the total conservation level will be cv1
R’ + cv2
F, which is not the first best. If 
cs = 0, the first-best will not be achieved either.  





R = C , we present an example. Suppose by contradiction that cv1
R’+cv2
R’ ￿ C . 
When benefits are quadratic, the regulator chooses cv1
R’ = [(C - qEcv2
F- (&2￿ &1)/(2-q)]￿(&2 – &1 and 
cv2
R’ = (C - qEcv2
F- (&2￿ &1)/(2-q), and this condition becomes  
[2(C - qEcv2
F) – q((&2 - &1)]/(2-q) ￿ C .  
Inserting the expressions for C , cm1
*, Ecm2
*, and Ecv2
F, rearranging, and simplifying we can rewrite this as 
2A – 2av - (&2 - &1 ￿S (am/av)(2A – 2am - (&2 - &1).  
Given p(am/av) ￿ 1 this implies 2A – 2av - (&2 - &1 ￿ 2A – 2am - (&2 - &1, or av ￿D m, which contradicts 
our assumption of lower marginal costs under a VCA.  
Finally, cv1
R’+cv2
R’ < C  = p(am/av)(cm1
*+Ecm2






Proof of Proposition 6 
To see that the outcome will not be the first best when the landowner has the bargaining power, 
note that the total conservation level when cs > 0 is cv1
L’ + cv2
F, which in general will not equal cv1
F+ cv2
F. 
Additionally, the first best will not be reached if cs = 0. 
The total conservation level when cs = 0 is cv1
L’+cv2
L’. To see that this is smaller than the total 
conservation achieved when the regulator has the bargaining power, suppose by contradiction that it is 






R’ +(1 – q)cv2
R’ = C  - qEcv2
F, which yields a contradiction, since C  - 
qEcv2






  To show that the total conservation may be lower than in a no surprises VCA, it suffices to 




L when p(am/av) ￿ 1, we use the quadratic 










L’, we obtain 
2(A-av-E&2) – 2[(av-$￿(&2)




1/2 + (&2 – &1 ￿
2(A-av-E&2) – 2[(av-$￿(&2)
2 – (2av/(2-q))((&2-&1-C ) + 2$(&2 - (&2





1/2 + (&2 – &1.  
By substituting in the expressions for cm1
*, Ecm2
*, C , and Ecv2
F, simplifying, and rearranging, we obtain 
  p(A – am)
2 – (A – av)
2 + (pam – av)(&1 ￿( &2) ￿￿ ￿      ( A 9 )  
Given am > av, it is easy to see that p(A – am)
2 – (A – av)
2 < 0. Additionally, p(am/av) ￿ 1 and &1, (&2 > 0 






Finally, to see that when cs = 0 and p(am/av) ￿ 1 the total conservation level is lower than that 










*, as shown in the proof of Proposition 5. 
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